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Epicurus is one of the major philosophers in the Hellenistic
period, the three centuries following the death of Alexander the Great in 323
BCE (and of Aristotle in 322
BCE). Epicurus developed an unsparingly materialistic metaphysics, empiricist
epistemology, and hedonistic ethics. Epicurus taught that the basic
constituents
of the world are atoms, uncuttable bits of matter, flying through empty space,
and he tried to explain all natural phenomena in atomic terms.
Epicurus rejected
the existence of Platonic forms and an immaterial soul, and he said that the
gods have no influence on our lives. Epicurus also thought skepticism was
untenable, and that we could gain knowledge of the world relying upon the
senses. He taught that the point of all one's actions was to attain pleasure
(conceived of as tranquility) for oneself, and that this could be done by
limiting one's desires and by banishing the fear of the gods and of death.
Epicurus' gospel of freedom from fear proved to be quite popular, and
communities of Epicureans flourished for centuries after his death.
Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to that part of this article)
Epicurus was born around 341 BCE, seven years after Plato's death, and grew up in the Athenian colony of Samos, an island in the Mediterranean Sea. He was about 19 when Aristotle died, and he studied philosophy under followers of Democritus and Plato. Epicurus founded his first philosophical schools in Mytilene and Lampsacus, before moving to Athens around 306 BCE. There Epicurus founded the Garden, a combination of philosophical community and school. The residents of the Garden put Epicurus' teachings into practice. Epicurus died from kidney stones around 271 or 270 BCE.
After Epicurus' death, Epicureanism continued to flourish as a
philosophical movement. Communities of Epicureans sprang up throughout the
Hellenistic world; along with Stoicism,
it was one
of the major philosophical schools competing for people's allegiances.
Epicureanism went into decline with the rise of Christianity.
Certain aspects
of Epicurus' thought were revived during the Renaissance
and early
modern periods, when reaction against scholastic neo-Aristotelianism led
thinkers to turn to mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena.
Sources
Epicurus was a voluminous writer, but almost none of his own work
survives. A
likely reason for this is that Christian authorities found his
ideas ungodly.
Diogenes
Laertius, who probably lived in the third century CE , wrote a
10-book Lives of the Philosophers, which includes three of Epicurus'
letters in its recounting of the life and teachings of Epicurus.
These three
letters are brief summaries of major areas of Epicurus' philosophy:
the Letter
to Herodotus, which summarizes his metaphysics, the Letter to
Pythocles, which
gives atomic explanations for meteorological phenomena, and the
Letter to
Menoeceus, which summarizes his ethics. It also includes the Principal
Doctrines, 40 sayings which deal mainly with ethical matters.
Because of the absence of Epicurus' own writings, we have to rely on later
writers to reconstruct Epicurus' thought. Two of our most important sources
are the Roman poet Lucretius
(c. 94-55
BCE) and the Roman politician Cicero
(106-43 BCE).
Lucretius was an Epicurean who wrote De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of
Things), a six-book poem expounding Epicurus' metaphysics.
Cicero was an
adherent of the skeptical academy,
who wrote a
series of works setting forth the major philosophical systems of his day,
including Epicureanism. Another major source is the essayist Plutarch (c.
50-120 CE), a Platonist. However, both Cicero and Plutarch were
very hostile
toward Epicureanism, so they must be used with care, since they
often are less
than charitable toward Epicurus, and may skew his views to serve their own
purposes.
Although the major outlines of Epicurus' thought are clear
enough, the lack
of sources means many of the details of his philosophy are still open to
dispute.
Metaphysics
Epicurus believes that the basic constituents of the world are atoms (which
are uncuttable, microscopic bits of matter) moving in the void (which is
simply empty space). Ordinary objects are conglomerations of atoms.
Furthermore, the properties of macroscopic bodies and all of the
events we see
occurring can be explained in terms of the collisions, reboundings, and
entanglements of atoms.
Arguments for the existence of atoms and
void
Epicurus' metaphysics starts from two simple points: (1) we
see that there are bodies in motion, and (2) nothing comes into
existence from
what does not exist. Epicurus takes the first point to be simply a datum of
experience. The second point is a commonplace of ancient Greek philosophy,
derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the principle that for
everything which occurs there is a reason or explanation for why it occurs,
and why this way rather than that).
First, because bodies move, there must be empty space for them
to move in,
and Epicurus calls this empty space 'void.' Second, the ordinary
bodies that
we see are compound bodies--that is, bodies which are made up of further
bodies, which is shown by the fact that they can be broken down
into smaller
pieces. However, Epicurus thinks that this process of division cannot go on
indefinitely, because otherwise bodies would dissolve away into
nothing. Also,
there must be basic and unchangeable building blocks of matter in order to
explain the regularities in nature. These non-compound bodies are
atoms--literally, 'uncuttables.' Only bodies and void exist per se,
that is, exist without depending for their existence on something
else. Other
things--such as colors, time, and justice--are ultimately explicable as
attributes of bodies.
Properties of Atoms, limitlessness of the
Universe
Because Epicurus believes that nothing comes into
existence from nothing, he thinks that the universe has no
beginning, but has
always existed, and will always exist. Atoms, too, as the basic building
blocks of all else, cannot come into existence, but have always
existed. Our
particular cosmos, however, is only a temporary agglomeration of
atoms, and it
is only one of an infinite number of such cosmoi, which come into existence
and then dissolve away. Against Aristotle,
Epicurus
argues that the universe is unlimited in size. If the universe were
limited in
size, says Epicurus, you could go to the end of it, stick your
fist out, and
where your fist was located would be the new 'limit' of the universe. Of
course, this process could be reiterated an endless number of
times. Since the
universe is unlimited in size, there must also be an unlimited
number of atoms
and an infinite amount of void. If the number of atoms were
limited, then the 'density' of atoms in any region would
effectively be zero, and there would be no macroscopic bodies, as there
evidently are. And there must be an unlimited amount of void,
since without a
limitless amount of void, the infinite number of atoms
would be unable to move.
Differences
from Democritus
Up to this
point, Epicurus is largely following the thought of Democritus, a
pre-Socratic philosopher and one of the inventors of atomism. However, he
modifies Democritus' atomism in at least three important ways.
Weight
The first is that Epicurus thinks that
atoms have weight. Like Democritus,
Epicurus
believes that atoms have the properties of size, shape, and resistance.
Democritus explains all atomic motion as the result of previous atomic
collisions, plus the inertia of atoms. Aristotle,
however,
criticizes Democritus on this point, saying that Democritus has
not explained
why it is that atoms move at all, rather than simply standing
still. Epicurus
seems to be answering this criticism when he says that atoms do
have a natural
motion of direction--'downward'--even though there is no bottom to the
universe. This natural motion is supposed to give an explanation
for why atoms
move in the first place. Also, Epicurus thinks that it is evident
that bodies
do tend to travel down, all else being equal, and he thinks that positing
weight as an atomic property accounts for this better than thinking
all atomic
motion is the result of past collisions and inertia.
The Swerve
The second modification of
Democritus' views is the addition of the 'swerve.' In addition to
the regular
tendency of atoms to move downward, Epicurus thinks that
occasionally, and at
random times, the atoms swerve to the side. One reason for this
swerve is that
it is needed to explain why there are atomic collisions. The
natural tendency
of atoms is to fall straight downward, at uniform velocity. If
this were the
only natural atomic motion, the atoms never would have collided with one
another, forming macroscopic bodies. As Lucretius
puts it,
they would 'fall downward, like drops of rain, through the deep void.' The
second reason for thinking that atoms swerve is that a random
atomic motion is
needed to preserve human freedom and 'break the bonds of fate,'
as Lucretius
says. If the laws of atomic motion are deterministic, then the
past positions
of the atoms in the universe, plus these laws, determine
everything that will
occur, including human action. Cicero reports that
Epicurus worries that, if it has been true from eternity that, e.g., "Milo
will wrestle tomorrow," then presently deliberating about whether to
make it true or false would be idle.
Sensible
Qualities
The third difference
between Epicurus and Democritus
has to do
with their attitudes toward the reality of sensible properties. Democritus
thinks that, in reality, only atoms and the void exist, and that sensible
qualities such as sweetness, whiteness, and the like exist only 'by
convention.' It is controversial exactly how to understand Democritus'
position, but most likely he is asserting that atoms themselves have no
sensible qualities--they are simply extended bits of stuff. The sensible
qualities that we think bodies have, like sweetness, are not really in the
object at all, but are simply subjective states of the
percipient's awareness
produced by the interaction of bodies with our sense-organs. This is shown,
thinks Democritus, by the fact that the same body appears differently to
different percipients depending on their bodily constitution, e.g., that a
'white' body appears yellow to somebody with jaundice, or that honey tastes
bitter to an ill person. From this, Democritus derives skeptical
conclusions.
He is pessimistic about our ability to gain any knowledge about
the world on
the basis of our senses, since they systematically deceive us about the way
the world is.
Epicurus wants to resist these pessimistic conclusions. He argues that
properties like sweetness, whiteness, and such do not exist at the atomic
level--individual atoms are not sweet or white--but that these
properties are
nonetheless real. These are properties of macroscopic bodies, but the
possession of these properties by macroscopic bodies are
explicable in terms
of the properties of and relations amongst the individual atoms
that make up
bodies. Epicurus thinks that bodies have the capability to cause us to have
certain types of experiences because of their atomic structure,
and that such
capabilities are real properties of the bodies. Similar
considerations apply
for properties like "being healthy," "being deadly," and "being enslaved."
They are real, but can only apply to groups of atoms (like people), not
individual atoms. And these sorts of properties are also relational
properties, not intrinsic ones. For example, cyanide is deadly--not deadly
per se, but deadly for human beings (and perhaps for
other types
of organisms). Nonetheless, its deadliness for us is still a real
property of
the cyanide, albeit a relational one.
Mechanistic explanations of natural
phenomena
One important aspect of Epicurus' philosophy is his
desire to replace teleological (goal-based) explanations of
natural phenomena
with mechanistic ones. His main target is mythological explanations of
meteorological occurrences and the like in terms of the will of the gods.
Because Epicurus wishes to banish the fear of the gods, he insists that
occurrences like earthquakes and lightning can be explained
entirely in atomic
terms and are not due to the will of the gods. Epicurus is also against the
intrinsic teleology of philosophers like Aristotle. Teeth
appear to be well-designed for the purpose of chewing. Aristotle
thinks that
this apparent purposiveness in nature cannot be eliminated, and that the
functioning of the parts of organisms must be explained by appealing to how
they contribute to the functioning of the organism as a whole. Other
philosophers, such as the Stoics, took this
apparent design as evidence for the intelligence and benevolence of God.
Epicurus, however, following Empedocles,
tries to
explain away this apparent purposiveness in nature in a
proto-Darwinian way,
as the result of a process of natural selection.
The gods
Because of its denial of divine
providence, Epicureanism was often charged in antiquity with
being a godless
philosophy, although Epicurus and his followers denied the charge. The main
upshot of Epicurean theology is certainly negative, however. Epicurus'
mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena are supposed to
displace
explanations that appeal to the will of the gods. In addition,
Epicurus is one
of the earliest philosophers we know of to have raised the Problem of Evil,
arguing against the notion that the world is under the
providential care of a
loving deity by pointing out the manifold suffering in the world.
Despite this, Epicurus says that there are gods, but these
gods are quite
different from the popular conception of gods. We have a conception of the
gods, says Epicurus, as supremely blessed and happy beings.
Troubling oneself
about the miseries of the world, or trying to administer the
world, would be
inconsistent with a life of tranquility, says Epicurus, so the gods have no
concern for us. In fact, they are unaware of our existence, and
live eternally
in the intermundia, the space between the cosmoi. For Epicurus, the gods
function mainly as ethical ideals, whose lives we can strive to
emulate, but
whose wrath we need not fear.
Ancient critics thought the Epicurean gods were a thin
smoke-screen to hide
Epicurus' atheism, and difficulties with a literal interpretation
of Epicurus'
sayings on the nature of the gods (for instance, it appears
inconsistent with
Epicurus' atomic theory to hold that any compound body, even a
god, could be
immortal) have led some scholars to conjecture that Epicurus' 'gods' are
thought-constructs, and exist only in human minds as idealizations,
i.e., the gods exist, but only as projections of what the most blessed life
would be.
Philosophy of
Mind
Epicurus is one of the
first philosophers to put forward an Identity Theory of
Mind. In modern versions of the identity theory, the mind is identified
with the brain, and mental processes are identified with neural processes.
Epicurus' physiology is quite different; the mind is identified as an organ
that resides in the chest, since the common Greek view was that the
chest, not
the head, is the seat of the emotions. However, the underlying
idea is quite
similar. (Note: not all commentators accept that Epicurus' theory
is actually
an Identity Theory.)
The main point that Epicurus wants to establish is that the mind is
something bodily. The mind must be a body, thinks Epicurus, because of its
ability to interact with the body. The mind is affected by the body, as
vision, drunkenness, and disease show. Likewise, the mind affects
the body, as
our ability to move our limbs when we want to and the physiological
effects of
emotional states show. Only bodies can interact with other bodies,
so the mind
must be a body. Epicurus says that the mind cannot be something
incorporeal,
as Plato thinks, since the only thing that is not a body is void, which is
simply empty space and cannot act or be acted upon.
The mind, then, is an organ in the body, and mental processes are
identified with atomic processes. The mind is composed of four
different types
of particles--fire, air, wind, and the "nameless element," which
surpasses the
other particles in its fineness. Although Epicurus is reticent about the
details, some features of the mind are accounted for in terms of
the features
of these atoms--for instance, the mind is able to be moved a great
deal by the
impact of an image (which is something quite flimsy), because of
the smallness
of the particles that make up the mind. The mind proper, which is primarily
responsible for sensation and thought, is located in the chest,
but Epicurus
thinks that there is also a 'spirit,' spread throughout the rest
of the body,
which allows the mind to communicate with it. The mind and spirit
play roles
very similar to those of the central and peripheral nervous
systems in modern
theory.
One important result of Epicurus' philosophy of mind is that death is
annihilation. The mind is able to engage in the motions of sensation and
thought only when it is housed in the body and the atoms that
make it up are
properly arranged. Upon death, says Epicurus, the container of the body
shatters, and the atoms disperse in the air. The atoms are eternal, but the
mind made up of these atoms is not, just as other compound bodies cease to
exist when the atoms that make them up disperse.
Perception
Epicurus explains
perception in terms of the interaction of atoms with the
sense-organs. Objects
continually throw off one-atom-thick layers, like the skin
peeling off of an
onion. These images, or "eidola," fly through the air and bang into one's
eyes, from which one learns about the properties of the objects
that threw off
these eidola. This explains vision. Other senses are analyzed in
similar terms; e.g., the soothing action of smooth atoms on the
tongue causes
the sensation of sweetness. As noted
above, Epicurus maintains that such sensible qualities are
real qualities
of bodies.
Epistemology
Epicurus' epistemology is resolutely empiricist and anti-skeptical. All of
our knowledge ultimately comes from the senses, thinks Epicurus, and we can
trust the senses, when properly used. Epicurus' epistemology was
contained in
his work the 'Canon,' or 'measuring stick,' which is lost, so many of the
details of his views are unavailable to us.
The Canon: sensations, preconceptions, and
feelings
Epicurus says that there are three criteria of truth:
sensations, 'preconceptions,' and feelings. Sensations give us information
about the external world, and we can test the judgments based upon
sensations
against further sensations; e.g., a provisional judgment that a tower is
round, based upon sensation, can be tested against later sensations to be
corroborated or disproved. Epicurus says that all sensations give us
information about the world, but that sensation itself is never in error,
since sensation is a purely passive, mechanical reception of images and the
like by sense-organs, and the senses themselves do not make
judgments 'that'
the world is this way or that. Instead, error enters in when we
make judgments
about the world based upon the information received through the senses.
Epicurus thinks that, in order to make judgments about the
world, or even
to start any inquiry whatsoever, we must already be in possession
of certain
basic concepts, which stand in need of no further proof or
definition, on pain
of entering into an infinite regress. This concern is similar to
the Paradox
of Inquiry explored by Plato in the Meno, that one must already know
about something in order to be able to inquire about it. However,
instead of
postulating that our immaterial souls had acquaintance with
transcendent Forms
in a pre-natal existence, as Plato does, Epicurus thinks that we
have certain
'preconceptions'--concepts such as 'body,' 'person,' 'usefulness,' and
'truth'--which are formed in our (material) minds as the result of repeated
sense-experiences of similar objects. Further ideas are formed by
processes of
analogy or similarity or by compounding these basic concepts.
Thus, all ideas
are ultimately formed on the basis of sense-experience.
Feelings of pleasure and pain form the basic criteria for what is to be
sought and avoided.
Anti-skeptical
Arguments
Epicurus is
concerned to refute the skeptical tendencies of Democritus, whose
metaphysics and theory of perception were similar to Epicurus'. At
least three
separate anti-skeptical arguments are given by Epicureans:
1. The "lazy
argument"
Epicurus says that it is
impossible to live as a skeptic. If a person really were to believe that he
knows nothing, then he would have no reason to engage in one
course of action
instead of another. Thus, the consistent skeptic would engage in no action
whatsoever, and would die.
2.
The self-refutation argument
If a skeptic
claims that nothing can be known, then one should ask whether he
knows
that nothing can be known. If he says 'yes,' then he is
contradicting himself.
If he doesn't say yes, then he isn't making a claim, and we don't need to
listen to him.
3. The argument from
concept-formation
If the
skeptic says that nothing can be known, or that we cannot know
the truth, we
can ask him where he gets his knowledge of concepts such as 'knowledge' and
'truth.' If the senses cannot be relied on, as the skeptic claims,
then he is
not entitled to use concepts such as 'knowledge' and 'truth' in formulating
his thesis, since such concepts derive from the senses.
Ethics
Epicurus' ethics is a form of egoistic hedonism; i.e., he says that the
only thing that is intrinsically valuable is one's own pleasure;
anything else
that has value is valuable merely as a means to securing pleasure for
oneself. However, Epicurus has a sophisticated and idiosyncratic
view of the
nature of pleasure, which leads him to recommend a virtuous, moderately
ascetic life as the best means to securing pleasure. This contrasts
Epicurus strongly with the Cyrenaics, a
group of ancient hedonists who better fit the stereotype of hedonists
as recommending a policy of "eat, drink, and be merry."
Hedonism, psychological and ethical
Epicurus' ethics starts from the Aristotelian commonplace that the highest
good is what is valued for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything
else, and Epicurus agrees with The second proof, which fits in well with Epicurus' empiricism,
supposedly
lies in one's introspective experience. One immediately perceives that
pleasure is good and that pain is bad, in the same way that one immediately
perceives that fire is hot; no further argument is needed to show
the goodness
of pleasure or the badness of pain. (Of course, this does not establish
Epicurus' further contention that only pleasure is intrinsically
valuable and only pain is intrinsically bad.)
Although all pleasures are good and all pains evil, Epicurus
says that not
all pleasures are choiceworthy or all pains to be avoided. Instead,
one should
calculate what is in one's long-term self-interest, and forgo what
will bring
pleasure in the short-term if doing so will ultimately lead to
greater pleasure in the long-term.
Types of
pleasure
For Epicurus,
pleasure is tied closely to satisfying one's desires. He
distinguishes between
two different types of pleasure: 'moving' pleasures and 'static' pleasures.
'Moving' pleasures occur when one is in the process of satisfying a desire,
e.g., eating a hamburger when one is hungry. These pleasures
involve an active
titillation of the senses, and these feelings are what most people call
'pleasure.' However, Epicurus says that after one's
desires have been
satisfied, (e.g., when one is full after eating), the state of
satiety, of no
longer being in need or want, is itself pleasurable. Epicurus calls this a
'static' pleasure, and says that these static pleasures are the best
pleasures.
Because of this, Epicurus denies that there is any intermediate state
between pleasure and pain. When one has unfulfilled desires, this
is painful,
and when one no longer has unfulfilled desires, this steady state
is the most
pleasurable of all, not merely some intermediate state between pleasure and
pain.
Epicurus also distinguishes between physical and mental pleasures and
pains. Physical pleasures and pains concern only the present,
whereas mental
pleasures and pains also encompass the past (fond memories of past
pleasure or
regret over past pain or mistakes) and the future (confidence or fear about
what will occur). The greatest destroyer of happiness, thinks Epicurus, is
anxiety about the future, especially fear of the gods and fear of
death. If one can banish fear about the future, and face the future
with confidence that one's desires will be satisfied, then one will attain
tranquility (ataraxia), the most exalted state. In fact, given
Epicurus' conception of pleasure, it might be less misleading to call him a
'tranquillist' instead of a 'hedonist.'
Types of desire
Because of the close
connection of pleasure with desire-satisfaction, Epicurus devotes a
considerable part of his ethics to analyzing different kinds of desires. If
pleasure results from getting what you want (desire-satisfaction) and pain
from not getting what you want (desire-frustration), then there are two
strategies you can pursue with respect to any given desire: you can either
strive to fulfill the desire, or you can try to eliminate the
desire. For the
most part Epicurus advocates the second strategy, that of paring
your desires
down to a minimum core, which are then easily satisfied.
Epicurus distinguishes between three types of desires: natural and
necessary desires, natural but non-necessary desires, and "vain and empty"
desires. Examples of natural and necessary desires include the desires for
food, shelter, and the like. Epicurus thinks that these desires are easy to
satisfy, difficult to eliminate (they are 'hard-wired' into human beings
naturally), and bring great pleasure when satisfied. Furthermore, they are
necessary for life, and they are naturally limited: that is, if one
is hungry,
it only takes a limited amount of food to fill the stomach, after which the
desire is satisfied. Epicurus says that one should try to fulfill these
desires.
Vain desires include desires for power, wealth, fame, and the like. They
are difficult to satisfy, in part because they have no natural
limit. If one
desires wealth or power, no matter how much one gets, it is always
possible to
get more, and the more one gets, the more one wants. These desires are not
natural to human beings, but inculcated by society and by false
beliefs about
what we need; e.g., believing that having power will bring us security from
others. Epicurus thinks that these desires should be eliminated.
An example of a natural but non-necessary desire is the desire
for luxury
food. Although food is needed for survival, one does not need a particular
type of food to survive. Thus, despite his hedonism, Epicurus advocates a
surprisingly ascetic way of life. Although one shouldn't spurn extravagant
foods if they happen to be available, becoming dependent on such goods
ultimately leads to unhappiness. As Epicurus puts it, "If you wish to make
Pythocles wealthy, don't give him more money; rather, reduce his
desires." By
eliminating the pain caused by unfulfilled desires, and the anxiety that
occurs because of the fear that one's desires will not be fulfilled in the
future, the wise Epicurean attains tranquility, and thus happiness.
The virtues
Epicurus' hedonism was widely
denounced in the ancient world as undermining traditional
morality. Epicurus,
however, insists that courage, moderation, and the other virtues
are needed in
order to attain happiness. However, the virtues for Epicurus are all purely
instrumental goods--that is, they are valuable solely for the sake of the
happiness that they can bring oneself, not for their own sake.
Epicurus says
that all of the virtues are ultimately forms of prudence, of
calculating what
is in one's own best interest. In this, Epicurus goes against the
majority of
Greek ethical theorists, such as the Stoics,
who identify
happiness with virtue, and Aristotle, who
identifies happiness with a life of virtuous activity. Epicurus thinks that
natural science and philosophy itself also are instrumental goods. Natural
science is needed in order to give mechanistic explanations of natural
phenomena and thus dispel the fear of the gods, while philosophy
helps to show
us the natural limits of our desires and to dispel the fear of death.
Justice
Epicurus is one of the first
philosophers to give a well-developed contractarian theory of justice.
Epicurus says that justice is an agreement "neither to harm nor be harmed,"
and that we have a preconception
of justice as "what is useful in mutual associations." People enter into
communities in order to gain protection from the dangers of the wild, and
agreements concerning the behavior of the members of the community
are needed
in order for these communities to function, e.g., prohibitions of
murder, regulations concerning the killing and eating of
animals, and so on. Justice exists only where there are such agreements.
Like the virtues, justice is valued entirely on instrumental grounds,
because of its utility for each of the members of society.
Epicurus says that
the main reason not to be unjust is that one will be punished if one gets
caught, and that even if one does not get caught, the fear of being caught
will still cause pain. However, he adds that the fear of
punishment is needed
mainly to keep fools in line, who otherwise would kill, steal, etc. The
Epicurean wise man recognizes the usefulness of the
laws, and since he does not desire great wealth, luxury goods,
political power, or the like, he sees that he has no reason to
engage in the conduct prohibited by the
laws in any case.
Although justice only exists where there is an agreement about how to
behave, that does not make justice entirely 'conventional,' if by
'conventional' we mean that any behavior dictated by the laws of a
particular society is thereby just, and that the laws of a particular
society are just for that society. Since the 'justice contract' is
entered into for the purpose of securing what is useful for the
members of the
society, only laws that are actually useful are just. Thus, a
prohibition of
murder would be just, but antimiscegenation laws would not. Since what is
useful can vary from place to place and time to time, what laws
are just can
likewise vary.
Friendship
Epicurus values friendship
highly and praises it in quite extravagant terms. He says that friendship
"dances around the world" telling us that we must "wake to blessedness." He
also says that the wise man is sometimes willing to die for a
friend. Because
of this, some scholars have thought that in this area, at least, Epicurus
abandons his egoistic hedonism and advocates altruism toward
friends. This is
not clear, however. Epicurus consistently maintains that friendship is
valuable because it is one of the greatest means of attaining pleasure.
Friends, he says, are able to provide one another the greatest security,
whereas a life without friends is solitary and beset with perils.
In order for
there to be friendship, Epicurus says, there must be trust between friends,
and friends have to treat each other as well as they treat themselves. The
communities of Epicureans can be seen as embodying these ideals,
and these are
ideals that ultimately promote ataraxia.
Death
One of the greatest fears that
Epicurus tries to combat is the fear of death. Epicurus thinks
that this fear
is often based upon anxiety about having an unpleasant afterlife; this
anxiety, he thinks, should be dispelled once one realizes that death is
annihilation, because the mind is a
group of atoms
that disperses upon death.
The
"no subject of harm" argument
If death is
annihilation, says Epicurus, then it is 'nothing to us.' Epicurus' main
argument for why death is not bad is contained in the Letter to
Menoeceus and can be dubbed the 'no subject of harm' argument. If death is
bad, for whom is it bad? Not for the living, since they're not dead,
and not for the dead, since they don't exist. His argument can be
set out as
follows:
Epicurus adds that if death causes you no pain when you're dead, it's
foolish to allow the fear of it to cause you pain now.
The "symmetry"
argument
A second Epicurean
argument against the fear of death, the so-called 'symmetry argument,' is
recorded by the Epicurean poet Lucretius.
He says that anyone who fears death should consider the time before he was
born. The past infinity of pre-natal non-existence is like the
future infinity
of post-mortem non-existence; it is as though nature has put up a mirror to
let us see what our future non-existence will be like. But we do
not consider
not having existed for an eternity before our births to be a
terrible thing;
therefore, neither should we think not existing for an eternity after our
deaths to be evil.
Select
Bibliography
This is not meant as comprehensive bibliography; rather, it's a selection
of further texts to read for those who want to learn more about
Epicurus and
Epicureanism. Most of the books listed below have extensive
bibliographies for
those looking for more specialized and scholarly publications.
Collections of Primary Sources:
The Epicurus Reader, translated and edited by Brad
Inwood and L.P.
Gerson, Hackett Publishing.
The Hellenistic philosophers, Volume 1: translations of the principal
sources, with philosophical commentary, by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley,
Cambridge University Press.
Lucretius, De Rerum Natura
Recent books on particular areas of Epicurus' philosophy:
The books below are all well-written and influential. They deal in-depth
with problems of interpreting particular areas of Epicurus'
philosophy, while
still remaining, for the most part, accessible to well-educated general
readers. They also have extensive bibliographies. However, do not
assume that
the interpretations of Epicurus in these books are always widely accepted.
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, by Julia Annas, University of
California Press.
Epicurus' Ethical Theory : The Pleasures of Invulnerability, by
Phillip Mitsis, Cornell University Press.
The Morality of Happiness, by Julia Annas, Oxford
University Press.
Epicurus' Scientific Method, by Elizabeth Asmis, Cornell
University
Press.
Tim O'Keefe
Author Information:
Email: tokeefets@REMOVEMEgsu.edu
Department of Philosophy
Georgia State University
P.O. Box 4089
Atlanta, GA 30302-4089
USA
HomePage: http://www.gsu.edu/~phltso